BRIEF FACTS :
- Appellant by deed dated 12.01.1983 purchased property in New Friends Colony. New Delhi. The son of appellant ( Raveen) married respondent Sneha Ahuja on 4.3.1995. After marriage both started living on the first floor of the said property.
- In July, 2014 there started marital discord between Raveen and respondent (Sneha). Raveenmovd out of the first floor and started living in the guest room of ground floor.
- Raveen, the husband of the respondent, filed divorce petition on 28.11.2014 u/s 13 (1)(ia) and (iii) HMA, 1955 on the ground of cruelty.
- The respondent on 20.1.2015 filed an application u’s 12 of Domestic Violence Act, 2005 against Raveen Ahuja (respondent no. 1), Satish Ahuja, father-in-law (respondent no. 2) and Dr. Prem KantaAhuja , mother-in-law (respondent no.3).
- Ld CMM, passed interim order : “ The respondents shall not alienate the shared household nor will dispossess the complainant or their children until further orders”
- Appellant filed suit in 2017 against defendant for mandatory and permanent injunction and claiming damages. Also pleaded that defendant as a counter blast filed complaint case under DV Act, 2005. Pleaded he and his wife have become victim of domestic violence on the part of defendant. Further, asserted that father-in-law has no obligation to maintain daughter-in-law during the lifetime of the husband. Thus, defendant to remove herself from the said property. Also, asked for recovery of damages.
- In W.S. defendant pleaded that the said property was acquired by plaintiff from joint family funds and not his self acquired property. Further, suit property is a shared household according to Sec. 2(s) of the Act, 2005, the defendant has right to reside in the shared household property.
- The Trial Court decreed the suit in the favour of plaintiff on the basis of admissions made by the respondent in the application filed under DV Act, 2005 and decreed for suit of mandatory and permanent injunction and directed respondent to vacate the premises .
- The High Court set aside the decree of the Trial Court on the ground that the decision of the tRial Court has not considered the effect of pending domestic violence application instituted by the daughter-in-law upon civil proceeding. The HC opined that the real question is not whether the suit property is a shared household or not and since domestic violence application is pending adjudication ,determination of this issue would seriously prejudice the interest of the defendant. Thus, matter remanded back to Trial Court for adjudication.
- Thus, present appeal by the plaintiff.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT :
- The suit property exclusively owned by the plaintiff is not a shared household. The son of the appellant has no right in the property. The son and daughter-in-law were only gratuitous licensee. The respondent can claim right to residence only in joint family property or husband of the respondent has share in it. In the property belonging to father of the husband the respondent has no right.
- Relied on the judgment of S.R. Batra and Anr. Vs. Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC 169, where two-Judge Bench of this Court held that the wife is entitled only to claim a right under Section 17(1)to residence in a shared household and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member.
- It is submitted that the complaint under the Act, 2005 filed by the respondent was only a counter blast to the Divorce Petition dated 28.11.2014 filed by the husband of the respondent. It is submitted that Sections 17and 19 of the Act, 2005 do not contemplate a proprietary or ownership right in the shared household for the aggrieved person. Shri Jauhar further submits that her claim for alternate accommodation can be made qua husband and not qua the father-in-law because her relationship in the household emanates pursuant to the marriage and father-in-law cannot be under a statutory obligation to provide for the residence and maintenance of daughter-in-law. Shri Jauhar submits that unless the definition of shared household under Section 2(s) is not interpreted in a manner confining the definition of shared household to joint family or the property where the husband has a share it will create chaos in the society. It is submitted that extensive interpretation of shared household would lead the chaos in the society which needs to be avoided for protecting peace and harmony in the society. He submitted that harmonious construction by interpretation in the suit is to be adopted so that the right of the parties are balanced.
SUBMISSIONS BY RESPONDENT
- Referring to definition of domestic relationship under Section 2(f)contended that respondent was in domestic relationship with the appellant and the appellant was respondent within the meaning of Section 2(q) against whom allegation of domestic violence was made in petition.
- referring to definition of shared household under Section 2(s) submits that factum of residence and domestic relationship with the respondent are the only qualification to fall within the ambit of definition of shared household. Shri Gupta submits that second part of the definition of the shared household is extensive in nature which gives certain example but cannot be said to be exhaustive looking at scheme of the Act. He submits that when ‘includes’ is used after the term “means” it is extensive and not exhaustive in nature. The respondent being in domestic relationship with the appellant living in the suit property since her marriage and continues to do so till date, the property is shared household where the appellant is staying. It is submitted that for shared household it is not necessary that aggrieved person should have any right, title or interest. It is further submitted that it is also not necessary that the husband of the woman should have any right, title or interest in the house. It is submitted that protection under Section 17 is available in all legal proceedings including the suit filed by the appellant.
- Referring to the judgment of this Court in S.R.Batra Vs. Taruna Batra, Shri Gupta submits that the said judgment is distinguishable on facts. He submits that the said case was pre-Act, 2005 case and secondly Taruna Batra admitted that she had shifted to her parents’ residence at the time of institution of the suit. It is submitted that the injunction was denied since Taruna Batra was not residing in the house which finding was not liable to be interfered with by the High Court under Article 226 or 227 as held by this Court. Shri Gupta further submits that the judgment of this Court in S.R. Batra case does not lay down correct law. He submits that the definition of “shared household” has not been correctly analysed in S.R. Batra case. The definition of respondent does not include only husband. The relatives of the husband who have treated the aggrieved person with domestic violence can be arrayed as respondent. There is no reason to extend definition of shared household only to property in which the husband has a share. It is submitted that S.R. Batra has not appreciated that second part of the definition of shared household is merely illustration and not exhaustive. S.R.Batra also erred in holding that alternative accommodation under Section 19 can only be enforced against the husband. Shri Gupta submits that the judgment of S.R. Batra does not correctly interpret provisions of Act, 2005.
ISSUES
(1)Whether definition of shared household under Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has to be read to mean that shared household can only be that household which is household of joint family or in which husband of the aggrieved person has a share?
(2) Whether judgment of this Court in S.R. Batra and Anr. Vs. Taruna Batra, (2007) 3 SCC 169 has not correctly interpreted the provision of Section 2(s) of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and does not lay down a correct law?
(3) Whether the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that suit filed by the appellant could not have been decreed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC?
(4) Whether, when the defendant in her written statement pleaded that suit property is her shared household and she has right to residence therein, the Trial Court could have decreed the suit of the plaintiff without deciding such claim of defendant which was permissible to be decided as per Section 26 of the Act, 2005?
(5) Whether the plaintiff in the suit giving rise to this appeal can be said to be the respondent as per definition of Section 2(q) of Act, 2005 ?
(6) What is the meaning and extent of the expression “save in accordance with the procedure established by law” as occurring in Section 17(2) of Act, 2005 ?
(7) Whether the husband of aggrieved party (defendant) is necessary party in the suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendant?
(8) What is the effect of orders passed under Section 19 of the Act, 2005 whether interim or final passed in the proceedings initiated in a civil court of competent jurisdiction?
OBSERVATION:
- Section 2(s), which uses both the expressions “means and includes” and looking to the context, the Court observed that the definition of shared household in Section 2(s) is an exhaustive definition. The first part of definition begins with expression “means” which is undoubtedly an exhaustive definition and second part of definition, which begins with word “includes” is explanatory of what was meant by the definition.
- The use of both the expressions “means and includes” in Section 2(s) of Act, 2005, thus, clearly indicate the legislative intent that the definition is exhaustive and shall cover only those which fall within the purview of definition and no other.
- Now, reverting back to the definition of Section 2(s), the definition can be divided in two parts, first, which follows the word “means” and second which follows the word “includes”. The second part which follows “includes” can be further sub-divided in two parts. The first part reads “shared household means a household where the person aggrieved has lived or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent”. Thus, first condition to be fulfilled for a shared household is that person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship. The second part sub- divided in two parts is- (a) includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent and owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and(b)includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household. In the above definition, two expressions, namely, “aggrieved person” and “respondent” have occurred. From the above definition, following is clear:- (i) it is not requirement of law that aggrieved person may either own the premises jointly or singly or by tenanting it jointly or singly; (ii) the household may belong to a joint family of which the respondent is a member irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household; and (iii) the shared household may either be owned or tenanted by the respondent singly or jointly.
ON S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra CASE
In S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) held that wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member. The definition of shared household as noticed in Section 2(s) does not indicate that a shared household shall be one which belongs to or taken on rent by the husband. We have noticed the definition of “respondent” under the Act. The respondent in a proceeding under Domestic Violence Act can be any relative of the husband. In event, the shared household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom in a domestic relationship the woman has lived, the conditions mentioned in Section 2(s) are satisfied and the said house will become a shared household. We are of the view that this court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) although noticed the definition of shared household as given in Section 2(s) but did not advert to different parts of the definition which makes it clear that for a shared household there is no such requirement that the house may be owned singly or jointly by the husband or taken on rent by the husband. The observation of this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) that definition of shared household in Section 2(s) is not very happily worded and it has to be interpreted, which is sensible and does not lead to chaos in the society also does not commend us. The definition of shared household is clear and exhaustive definition as observed by us. The object and purpose of the Act was to grant a right to aggrieved person, a woman of residence in shared household. The interpretation which is put by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) if accepted shall clearly frustrate the object and purpose of the Act. We, thus, are of the opinion that the interpretation of definition of shared household as put by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) is not correct interpretation and the said judgment does not lay down the correct law.
In view of the foregoing discussions, we answer issue Nos. 1 and 2 in following manner:-
(i) The definition of shared household given in Section 2(s) cannot be read to mean that shared household can only be that household which is household of the joint family of which husband is a member or in which husband of the aggrieved person has a share.
(ii) The judgment of this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra (supra) has not correctly inter-
preted Section 2(s) of Act, 2005 and the judgment does not lay down a correct law.
ISSUE NO. 3
The question which is posed for the consideration is, whether the learned Trial Court was justified in passing the decree on alleged admission under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC or not. What is required to be considered is what constitutes the admission warranting the judgment on admission in exercise of powers under Order XII Rule 6, CPC.In view of the ratio laid down by this court in the above case, the claim of the defendant that suit property is shared household and she has right to reside in the house ought to have been considered by the Trial Court and non-consideration of the claim/defence is nothing but defeating the right, which is protected by Act, 2005.
The power under Order XII Rule 6 is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. In the facts of the present case, the Trial Court ought not to have given judgment under Order XII Rule 6 on the admission of the defendant as contained in her application filed under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. We, thus, concur with the view of the High Court that the judgment and decree of the Trial Court given under Order XII rule 6 is unsustainable.
ISSUE NO. 5
. We, thus, are of the view that for the purposes of determination of right of defendant under Sections 17 and 19 read with Section 26 in the suit in question the plaintiff can be treated as “respondent”, but for the grant of any relief to the defendant or for successful resisting the suit of the plaintiff necessary conditions for grant of relief as prescribed under the Act, 2005 has to be pleaded and proved by the defendant, only then the relief can be granted by the Civil Court to the defendant.
ISSUE NO. 6
Drawing the analogy from the above case, we are of the opinion that the expression “save in accordance with the procedure established by law”, in Section 17(2) of the Act, 2005 contemplates the proceedings in court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, suit for mandatory and permanent injunction/eviction or possession by the owner of the property is maintainable before a Competent Court. We may further notice that in sub-section (2) the injunction is “shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household save in accordance with procedure established by law”. Thus, the provision itself contemplates adopting of any procedure established by law by the respondent for eviction or exclusion of the aggrieved person from the shared household. Thus, in appropriate case, the competent court can decide the claim in a properly instituted suit by the owner as to whether the women need to be excluded or evicted from the shared household. One most common example for eviction and exclusion may be when the aggrieved person is provided same level of alternate accommodation or payment of rent as contemplated by Section 19 sub-section (f) itself. There may be cases where plaintiff can successfully prove before the Competent Court that the claim of plaintiff for eviction of respondent is accepted. We need not ponder for cases and circumstances where eviction or exclusion can be allowed or refused. It depends on facts of each case for which no further discussion is necessary in the facts of the present case. The High Court in the impugned judgment has also expressed opinion that suit filed by the plaintiff cannot be held to be non- maintainable with which conclusion we are in agreement.
In case, the shared household of a woman is a tenanted/allotted/licensed accommodation where tenancy/ allotment/license is in the name of husband, father-in- law or any other relative, the Act, 2005 does not operate against the landlord/lessor/licensor in initiating an appropriate proceedings for eviction of the tenant/allottee/licensee qua the shared household. However, in case the proceedings are due to any collusion between the two, the woman, who is living in the shared household has right to resist the proceedings on all grounds which the tenant/lessee/licensee could have taken in the proceedings. The embargo under Section 17(2) of Act, 2005 of not to be evicted or excluded save in accordance with the procedure established by law operates only against the “respondent”, i.e., one who is respondent within the meaning of Section 2(q) of Act, 2005.
ISSUE NO. 7
There can be no dispute with the preposition of law as laid down by this Court in the above two cases. In the present case, although plaintiff has not claimed any relief against his son, Raveen Ahuja, the husband of the respondent, hence, he was not a necessary party but in view of the fact that respondent has pleaded her right of residence in shared household relying on Sections 17 and 19 of the Act, 2005 and one of the rights which can be granted under Section 19 is right of alternate accommodation, the husband is a proper party. The right of maintenance as per the provisions of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 is that of the husband, hence he may be a proper party in cases when the Court is to consider the claim of respondent under Sections 17 and 19 read with Section 26 of the Act, 2005.
- Civil Procedure Code, Order I Rule 10 empowers the Court at any stage of the proceedings either on an application or suo moto to add a party either as plaintiff or defendant, whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. The High Court in paragraph 56(i) has issued following directions:-
“56. In these circumstances, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained and are accordingly set aside. The matters are remanded back to the Trial Court for fresh adjudication in accordance with the directions given hereinbelow:
(i)At the first instance, in all cases where the respondent’s son/the appellant’s husband has not been impleaded, the Trial Court shall direct his impleadment by invoking its suo motu powers under Order I Rule 10 CPC.
- The above direction is a little wide and preemptory. In event, the High Court was satisfied that impleadment of husband of defendant was necessary, the High Court itself could have invoked the power under Order I Rule 10 and directed for such impleadment. When the matter is remanded back to the Trial Court, Trial Court’s discretion ought not to have been fettered by issuing such a general direction as noted above. The general direction issued in paragraph 56(i) is capable of being misinterpreted. Whether the husband of an aggrieved person in a particular case needs to be added as plaintiff or defendant in the suit is a matter, which need to be considered by the Court taking into consideration all aspects of the matter.
We are, thus, of the view that direction in paragraph 56(i) be not treated as a general direction to the Courts to implead in all cases the husband of an aggrieved person and it is the Trial Court which is to exercise the jurisdiction under Order I Rule 10. The direction in paragraph 56(i) are, thus, need to be read in the manner as indicated above.
- Now, coming to the present case, we have already observed that although husband of the defendant was not a necessary party but in view of the pleadings in the written statement, the husband was a proper party.
ISSUE NO. 8
From the above discussions, we arrive at following conclusions:-
(i) The pendency of proceedings under Act, 2005 or any order interim or final passed under D.V. Act under Section 19 regarding right of residence is not an embargo for initiating or continuing any civil proceedings, which relate to the subject matter of order in-
terim or final passed in proceedings under D.V. Act, 2005.
(ii) The judgment or order of criminal court granting an interim or final relief under Section 19 of D.V. Act, 2005 are relevant within the meaning of Section 43 of the Evi-
dence Act and can be referred to and looked into by the civil court.
(iii) A civil court is to determine the issues in civil proceedings on the basis of evidence, which has been led by the parties before the civil court.
(iv) In the facts of the present case, suit filed in civil court for mandatory and permanent injunction was fully maintainable and the issues raised by the appellant as well as by the defendant claiming a right under Section 19 were to be addressed and decided on the basis of evidence, which is led by the par-
ties in the suit.
In view of the foregoing discussions, we are of the considered opinion that High Court has rightly set aside the decree of the Trial Court and remanded the matter for fresh adjudication. With the observations as above, the appeal is dismissed. No Costs.
JUDGMENT ANALYSIS
The main issue involved in this petition was “Whether the daughter-in-law can claim residential rights at our in-laws’ house both during and after the proceedings of domestic violence?” And also the interpretation of “shared household” as given under Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
The Court while answering the said issue in affirmative and reversed its previous decision given in S.R. Batra v. Taruna Batra (2007) 3 SCC 169.
When in Taruna Batra case, a two-judge bench had given the decision that a woman has no right to live in a property owned by her husband’s parents. In that case, the court claimed that the daughter in law only has residence rights in her husband’s property.
But now in the recent decision, the top court held that the wife also has the residence right in ‘shared household’ of the joint family. Because as per Section (2) of the Domestic Violence Act, a wife under domestic violence has the legal right in the ‘shared household’.
In the present case the Supreme Court has widened the definition of “shared household” to include the property owned by the relative of the husband as well. Earlier in the Taruna Batra case, the SC observed that “shared household” would mean only a house belonging or taken on rent by the husband or a house of joint family of which husband is a member. Now, this has been reversed in the present case.
The court observed that even if the house belonged to her father-in-law and the son had no share in the house belongings but the daughter-in-law had been living in the first floor of the house since her marriage in a domestic relationship, thereby making it a “shared household” under the definition of domestic violence act.
The Court finally held that a wife is entitled to claim the right to residence in a shared household belonging to either the husband or the relatives of the husband.
My Opinion :
One aspect of this judgment is that it is indeed a great relief for the women who are mistreated and tortured by their in-laws. Now the aggrieved daughter-in-laws had the right to claim the shared household of the joint family under the domestic violence act. So in order to improve the condition of women in the country, our judiciary is continuously trying to amend the provisions so that the status of women gets at par with men.
That this judgment miserably fails the elderly parents especially who have been caught in the myriad of a failed relationship between a husband and wife. The judgment ought to have looked at the increasing misuse of various provisions incorporated for protecting women rights in our country this judgment indeed gives more weapons in the hands of women to harass the opposing party.
The need of the hour is to adopt balanced approach by the judiciary while dealing with such issues in order to balance the rights of all the parties involved.
—ADVOCATE AKSHI BALI
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