Reetu And Another vs State Of U.P. And 9 Others

Court: Allahabad High Court

Bench: J.J. Munir

Reetu And Another vs State Of U.P. And 9 Others on 17 September, 2020

Law Point:

Habeas Corpus – Custody of child can certainly be issued where child is in custody of relative or a person, who is not lawful guardian though not an utter stranger

JUDGEMENT

1. Smt. Reetu, the first petitioner says that her minor son, Mohan @ Bholey, the second petitioner has been unlawfully detained by respondent nos.6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. She prays that a writ in the nature of habeas corpus be issued to respondent nos.6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, ordering them to produce the second petitioner before this Court and upon production, the said minor be set at liberty by placing him in her custody.

2. A rule nisi was issued on 24.08.2020, ordering the minor, Mohan @ Bholey, to be produced before the Court on 27.08.2020 at 2:00 p.m. On 27.08.2020, the minor was produced in the manner and the time directed. This Court finding the minor to be a very young child, aged about 3 years, thought it appropriate to hear the matter in camera. The case was directed to be put up in Chambers at 4:00 p.m., where family members of the minor alone were allowed along with learned Counsel. During the hearing in Chambers, this Court while reserving judgment, recorded the following orders:

“This matter has been taken up in Chambers today at 4 p.m., in accordance with the earlier order of the day, in presence of Sri Vikrant Singh Parihar, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Sri Ajit Kumar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent nos.8 and 9, who are the grandmother of the minor and the father’s elder brother. respondent nos.6 and 7, who are the sister and the sister’s husband of the minor’s deceased father, are not required to be heard. Respondent no.10, Chhotey Lal is reported to be dead.

I have spoken to the minor Mohan @ Bholey in Chambers. He is a very young child of three years. I have also spoken to the mother, petitioner no.1, the grandmother of the minor, respondent no.8, in whose custody the minor presently stays and respondent no.9, Deen Dayal. Learned Counsel for both parties have addressed this Court on merits of their respective cases. Judgment reserved.”

3. Heard Sri Vikrant Singh Parihar, learned Counsel for the petitioners and Sri Ajit Kumar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent nos.8 and 9.

4. It must be recorded here that respondent nos.8 and 9, the minor’s grandmother and his uncle (the father’s elder brother), who have appeared to show cause in the matter, have chosen not to file a counter affidavit. The matter was, therefore, heard on the basis of averments made and the material annexed to the habeas corpus writ petition, ascertaining the stand of parties and also speaking to the minor, Mohan @ Bholey. What the parties, including the minor, have said and what this Court has been able to ascertain from them, would figure a little later in this judgment.

5. The facts giving rise to this petition are these: Smt. Reetu, the first petitioner was married to one Shyam Sundar alias Shyamu according to Hindu rites on 20.02.2015. Shyam Sundar alias Shyamu is no more. He has committed suicide on 14.07.2019. Of the wedlock of parties, two children were born, to wit, Mohan @ Bholey, the detenue and Km. Jhalak. It is made out that the first petitioner’s husband was unemployed and in financial distress. He had borrowed some money from respondent no.6, his sister’s husband. He could not liquidate the debt that he owed to the sixth respondent. It is claimed that the first petitioner’s husband took away all that she had in jewellery. This had led to a bitter dispute between the first petitioner’s husband and all the private respondents. Distressed and distraught, the first petitioner’s husband along with the first petitioner and their two children left his parents’ home and went to stay with his in-laws. It is claimed that anguished and distressed, he consumed some poisonous substance once, but was saved. On a second attempt, he was not that lucky and passed away on 14.07.2019. The first petitioner had gone over to her in-laws’ place to participate in the last rites of her husband. Post the thirteenth day rite (तेरहवीं), respondent nos.6, 7, 8 and 9 ousted the first petitioner from her matrimonial home, abusing and battering her in the process.

6. It is averred by the first petitioner that respondent nos.6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 unlawfully detained the second petitioner, her minor son, Mohan @ Bholey. Smt. Reetu says that all her efforts, to regain custody of her minor son, have been in vain. Smt. Reetu says that she is the natural guardian of her minor son, whereas none of the respondents are entitled in law to his custody. It is also averred in the petition that on 08.06.2020, Smt. Reetu made applications to the Superintendent of Police, Etah and the Station House Officer, Police Station Jaitharana, District Etah to liberate her minor from the unlawful custody of respondent nos.6 and 7, and to entrust him to her care. She has annexed copies of those two applications and the photostat copies of registered postal receipts, evidencing dispatch of the two applications, last mentioned to the concerned Authorities. It is in the aforesaid facts and circumstances that the first petitioner has moved this Court.

7. Mr. Ajit Kumar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent nos.8 and 9 submits that they are no strangers to the minor and cannot be called persons who are holding him in unlawful custody. Respondent no.8 is the minor’s grandmother (father’s mother), whereas respondent no.9 is his uncle (father’s elder brother). He takes objection to the maintainability of this habeas corpus writ petition by urging that a writ of habeas corpus can be issued against one who holds the minor in unlawful custody. A grandmother and a father’s brother cannot be placed in that category. It may be that the first petitioner can establish a better right to the minor’s custody, but that right can be established in duly constituted proceedings under Section 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (for short, ”the Act’). A writ of habeas corpus is out of place and cannot issue.

8. Mr. Parihar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, on the other hand, argues that respondent nos.8 and 9, notwithstanding their kinship and blood relationship to the minor, are not natural guardians in the mother’s presence. The mother is a natural guardian under Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 along with the father. In the father’s absence, according to the learned Counsel for the first petitioner, the mother alone is the natural guardian, whereas the right to custody asserted by the minor’s grandmother and his uncle is unlawful enough to entitle this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus.

9. This Court has keenly considered the rival submissions of parties, both about the maintainability and the sustainability of the first petitioner’s claim. The Court proposes to dispose of the challenge as to maintainability, first in order.

10. This issue fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in Syed Saleemuddin v. Dr. Rukhsana and Ors., (2001) 5 SCC 247. It was held by their Lordships thus:

“11. From the principles laid down in the aforementioned cases it is clear that in an application seeking a writ of Habeas Corpus for custody of minor children the principal consideration for the Court is to ascertain whether the custody of the children can be said to be unlawful or illegal and whether the welfare of the children requires that present custody should be changed and the children should be left in care and custody of somebody else. The principle is well settled that in a matter of custody of a child the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration of the Court. Unfortunately, the Judgment of the High Court does not show that the Court has paid any attention to these important and relevant questions. The High Court has not considered whether the custody of the children with their father can, in the facts and circumstances, be said to be unlawful. The Court has also not adverted to the question whether for the welfare of the children they should be taken out of the custody of their father and left in the care of their mother. However, it is not necessary for us to consider this question further in view of the fair concession made by Shri M.N. Rao that the appellant has no objection if the children remain in the custody of the mother with the right of the father to visit them as noted in the judgment of the High Court, till the Family Court disposes of the petition filed by the appellant for custody of his children.”

11. Again, the question engaged the attention of the Supreme Court in Nithya Anand Raghavan vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and another, (2017) 8 SCC 454. In Nithya Anand Raghavan, it was held:

“44. The present appeal emanates from a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus for the production and custody of a minor child. This Court in Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling [Kanu Sanyal v. District Magistrate, Darjeeling, (1973) 2 SCC 674 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 980] , has held that habeas corpus was essentially a procedural writ dealing with machinery of justice. The object underlying the writ was to secure the release of a person who is illegally deprived of his liberty. The writ of habeas corpus is a command addressed to the person who is alleged to have another in unlawful custody, requiring him to produce the body of such person before the court. On production of the person before the court, the circumstances in which the custody of the person concerned has been detained can be inquired into by the court and upon due inquiry into the alleged unlawful restraint pass appropriate direction as may be deemed just and proper. The High Court in such proceedings conducts an inquiry for immediate determination of the right of the person’s freedom and his release when the detention is found to be unlawful.

45. In a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in relation to the custody of a minor child, this Court in Sayed Saleemuddin v. Rukhsana [Sayed Saleemuddin v. Rukhsana, (2001) 5 SCC 247 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 841] , has held that the principal duty of the court is to ascertain whether the custody of child is unlawful or illegal and whether the welfare of the child requires that his present custody should be changed and the child be handed over to the care and custody of any other person. While doing so, the paramount consideration must be about the welfare of the child. In Elizabeth [Elizabeth Dinshaw v. Arvand M. Dinshaw, (1987) 1 SCC 42 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 13] , it is held that in such cases the matter must be decided not by reference to the legal rights of the parties but on the sole and predominant criterion of what would best serve the interests and welfare of the minor. The role of the High Court in examining the cases of custody of a minor is on the touchstone of principle of parens patriae jurisdiction, as the minor is within the jurisdiction of the Court [see Paul Mohinder Gahun v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Paul Mohinder Gahun v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2004 SCC OnLine Del 699 : (2004) 113 DLT 823] relied upon by the appellant]. It is not necessary to multiply the authorities on this proposition.

46. The High Court while dealing with the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus concerning a minor child, in a given case, may direct return of the child or decline to change the custody of the child keeping in mind all the attending facts and circumstances including the settled legal position referred to above. Once again, we may hasten to add that the decision of the court, in each case, must depend on the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case brought before it whilst considering the welfare of the child which is of paramount consideration. The order of the foreign court must yield to the welfare of the child. Further, the remedy of writ of habeas corpus cannot be used for mere enforcement of the directions given by the foreign court against a person within its jurisdiction and convert that jurisdiction into that of an executing court. Indubitably, the writ petitioner can take recourse to such other remedy as may be permissible in law for enforcement of the order passed by the foreign court or to resort to any other proceedings as may be permissible in law before the Indian Court for the custody of the child, if so advised.

47. In a habeas corpus petition as aforesaid, the High Court must examine at the threshold whether the minor is in lawful or unlawful custody of another person (private respondent named in the writ petition). For considering that issue, in a case such as the present one, it is enough to note that the private respondent was none other than the natural guardian of the minor being her biological mother. Once that fact is ascertained, it can be presumed that the custody of the minor with his/her mother is lawful. In such a case, only in exceptionable situation, the custody of the minor (girl child) may be ordered to be taken away from her mother for being given to any other person including the husband (father of the child), in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Instead, the other parent can be asked to resort to a substantive prescribed remedy for getting custody of the child.

12. This question about the maintainability of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus came up for consideration before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Tejaswini Gaud and others vs. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad Tewari and others, (2019) 7 SCC 42. The question has been elaborately examined by their Lordships in Tejaswini Gaud, and it has been held:

“19. Habeas corpus proceedings is not to justify or examine the legality of the custody. Habeas corpus proceedings is a medium through which the custody of the child is addressed to the discretion of the Court. Habeas corpus is a prerogative writ which is an extraordinary remedy and the writ is issued where in the circumstances of the particular case, ordinary remedy provided by the law is either not available or is ineffective; otherwise a writ will not be issued. In child custody matters, the power of the High Court in granting the writ is qualified only in cases where the detention of a minor by a person who is not entitled to his legal custody. In view of the pronouncement on the issue in question by the Supreme Court and the High Courts, in our view, in child custody matters, the writ of habeas corpus is maintainable where it is proved that the detention of a minor child by a parent or others was illegal and without any authority of law.

20. In child custody matters, the ordinary remedy lies only under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act or the Guardians and Wards Act as the case may be. In cases arising out of the proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by whether the minor ordinarily resides within the area on which the court exercises such jurisdiction. There are significant differences between the enquiry under the Guardians and Wards Act and the exercise of powers by a writ court which is summary in nature. What is important is the welfare of the child. In the writ court, rights are determined only on the basis of affidavits. Where the court is of the view that a detailed enquiry is required, the court may decline to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction and direct the parties to approach the civil court. It is only in exceptional cases, the rights of the parties to the custody of the minor will be determined in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction on a petition for habeas corpus.

21. In the present case, the appellants are the sisters and brother of the mother Zelam who do not have any authority of law to have the custody of the minor child. Whereas as per Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, the first respondent father is a natural guardian of the minor child and is having the legal right to claim the custody of the child. The entitlement of father to the custody of child is not disputed and the child being a minor aged 1½ years cannot express its intelligent preferences. Hence, in our considered view, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the father, being the natural guardian, was justified in invoking the extraordinary remedy seeking custody of the child under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

13. A writ of habeas corpus can certainly be issued in matters relating to custody of a child where the child is in custody of a relative or a person, who is not the lawful guardian, though not an utter stranger. A kinsman or a relative of the child, who holds the child in custody back from the lawful guardian, would entitle the lawful guardian to seek restoration of custody through a writ of habeas corpus. The question, whether the person who applies for the writ is the lawful guardian or not, is generally to be determined with reference to the personal law, applicable to parties. However so, the Court may also inquire into for the purpose of determining the legality of the custody, from which liberation is sought, vis-a-vis the right of the person asking for the writ, the question of welfare of the minor.

14. Under the provisions of the Act, the welfare of the minor is of paramount consideration. At the same time, Sections 17 and 19 of the Act and the said statute, as a whole, has been interpreted consistently to prevail over the personal law of parties when the question about appointment or declaration of a guardian or the custody of a minor arises. Section 6 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, clearly provides that the mother is a natural guardian of the minor and a wealth of decisions of Courts in our country have been consistent that the welfare of a minor, which is of paramount consideration under the Act, also is best secured in the mother’s hands. This issue would be examined a little later.

15. The point presently under consideration does not spare doubt that a mother pitted against the minor’s grandmother and the father’s brother can certainly say that the minor is in their unlawful custody, entitling her to maintain a writ petition, asking for a writ of habeas corpus. It is, accordingly, held that this petition is maintainable.

16. Now, turning to the entitlement of the first petitioner to succeed in her claim for a writ of habeas corpus, the inquiry by its nature before this Court is very summary. This Court is mindful of the fact that respondent nos.8 and 9 are the grandmother and the father’s brother of the minor. They are not utter strangers, but kindred. Even if the mother is the minor’s natural guardian, these respondents certainly have an interest in the minor’s welfare and well being, together with a right to be in association with him. But, normally, in the presence of the minor’s natural guardian, the grandmother and the father’s brother would not be entitled to the minor’s custody. There could be a case, where these blood relations may demonstrate that conditions do exist or circumstances obtain, that render the mother unfit to hold the minor’s custody. These circumstances, in extreme contingencies, are illustrated by a situation, where the mother is leading an immoral life or in a more benign situation is suffering from a serious disease or mental ailment. There could be other circumstances also, where these blood relations could establish that the welfare of the minor would not be best secured in the mother’s hand and further that it would be better secured with them. This Court, however, is not the forum to determine that question. The private respondents have all the liberty to establish their right to the minor’s custody before a Court of the competent jurisdiction under the Act. So far as this Court is concerned, in the nature of the summary inquiry, there is enough warrant in law to assume that in the presence of the natural guardian, that is the mother, respondent nos.8 and 9, that is to say, the grandmother and the father’s brother are not entitled to hold the minor’s custody. There is a strong presumption that parents, and particularly, the mother secures the child’s welfare, the best. In this connection, reference may be made to the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Rafiq vs. Smt. Bashiran and another, AIR 1963 RAJ 239. In Rafiq (supra), it was held:

“(4) There is nothing on record to show that the father of the minor is unfit to be the guardian of her person. As was observed in B.N. Ganguly v. G.H. Sarkar, AIR 1961 Madh-Pra 173 there is a presumption that the parents will be able to exercise good care in the welfare of their children.”

17. This question engaged the attention of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Khaled Kamal Hussein Mohamed Kassem An Egyptian Citizen vs. State of Maharashtra Through Chandan Nagar Police Station and Others, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 166. The case arose out of a maze of complicated human relations, where the petitioner asked for the custody of his minor son, held by his deceased wife’s mother and sister. The petitioner was an Egyptian citizen, a Muslim, whereas his wife was a indian and a Hindu. They had married under the Special Marriage Act and were blessed with a son, whose custody was in issue. Unfortunately, the wife passed away and the petitioner who was serving outside the country, but frequently visiting his wife and the new born child, asked for the minor’s custody. In the exercise of their jurisdiction, to deal with the custody issue by a writ of habeas corpus, their Lordships of the Division Bench entered judgment, that was expressed to be tentative. The determination was held, subject to regular proceeding before a Court of competent jurisdiction under the Act, if resorted to by the parties. The overbearing principle that one cannot miss in the decision is that a definitive preference was expressed, albeit tentative, in favour of the surviving parent and a natural guardian of the child, that is, the father. Speaking for the Bench, S.S. Shinde, J. held:

“85. As it is clear from the observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Para 18 that, just because the parents are at war with each other, does not mean that the child should be denied the care, affection, love or protection of any one of the two parents. In the present case, it is admitted position that, the Petitioner is the only surviving parent and natural guardian of child Kian. As already observed he has taken care of child Kian in past and there is no room for doubt that, he can look after welfare of child Kian even in future.”

18. Now, since welfare of the minor is the most fundamental guiding principle, it is that which has to be the criterion, even in summary decision making. This Court has already referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Tejaswini Gaud in the context of maintainability of a writ petition in child custody matters. Paragraph no.21 of the report quoted (supra) indicates a preference in favour of the natural guardian, who was the father in the case under reference, before their Lordships, over the other side, who were the minor’s kindred. In Tejaswini Gaud (supra), it was held on the issue of welfare of the minor, thus:

“35. The welfare of the child has to be determined owing to the facts and circumstances of each case and the Court cannot take a pedantic approach. In the present case, the first respondent has neither abandoned the child nor has deprived the child of a right to his love and affection. The circumstances were such that due to illness of the parents, the appellants had to take care of the child for some time. Merely because, the appellants being the relatives took care of the child for some time, they cannot retain the custody of the child. It is not the case of the appellants that the first respondent is unfit to take care of the child except contending that he has no female support to take care of the child. The first respondent is fully recovered from his illness and is now healthy and having the support of his mother and is able to take care of the child.

36. The appellants submit that handing over of the child to the first respondent would adversely affect her and that the custody can be handed over after a few years. The child is only 1½ years old and the child was with the father for about four months after her birth. If no custody is granted to the first respondent, the Court would be depriving both the child and the father of each other’s love and affection to which they are entitled. As the child is in tender age i.e. 1½ years, her choice cannot be ascertained at this stage. With the passage of time, she might develop more bonding with the appellants and after some time, she may be reluctant to go to her father in which case, the first respondent might be completely deprived of her child’s love and affection. Keeping in view the welfare of the child and the right of the father to have her custody and after consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the High Court was right in holding that the welfare of the child will be best served by handing over the custody of the child to the first respondent.

37. Taking away the child from the custody of the appellants and handing over the custody of the child to the first respondent might cause some problem initially; but, in our view, that will be neutralised with the passage of time. However, till the child is settled down in the atmosphere of the first respondent father’s house, Appellants 2 and 3 shall have access to the child initially for a period of three months for the entire day i.e. 8.00 a.m. to 6.00 p.m. at the residence of the first respondent. The first respondent shall ensure the comfort of Appellants 2 and 3 during such time of their stay in his house. After three months, Appellants 2 and 3 shall visit the child at the first respondent’s house from 10.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays. After the child completes four years, Appellants 2 and 3 are permitted to take the child on every Saturday and Sunday from the residence of the father from 11.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. and shall hand over the custody of the child back to the first respondent father before 5.00 p.m. For any further modification of the visitation rights, either parties are at liberty to approach the High Court.”

19. In a recent decision, a Division Bench of this Court, in Manuj Sharma vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No.82 of 2019, decided on 12th April, 2019, preferred the mother in the matter of custody of a two and half years child over the father – both natural guardian – on an abiding principle that in case of children of tender years, the mother is more suitable to hold custody. The plea that the mother is not financially well off was negatived as a disentitling factor. In Manuj Sharma (supra), it was held:

“25. In view of the principles of law laid down by various Courts, if facts of the present case are seen, it is apparent that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his two minor children are illegally detained by his wife (respondent no.7). The limited contention of the petitioner is about the welfare of his children, which according to his own assessment, can be better if children would be with him. We are afraid, this self-appreciated statement of the petitioner will not give him any benefit in the present case. The mere fact that the financial condition of the petitioner is superior than that of respondent no.7, does not give him any right for issuance of writ of habeas corpus. If financial position is the only criteria, then in every case, a person who is financially strong would claim custody of child. If a mother is struggling for her rights along with her children, even assuming that she is financially weak, she cannot be deprived of her children just because her husband is a moneyed man. The judgments relied upon by counsel for the petitioner are of no help to him. Even otherwise, in the case in hand, age of the second child of the petitioner and respondent no.7 is just about 2 1/2 years and, we do not wish to separate the small baby from her mother as well as her sister.”

20. Now, in the present case, this Court interacted with the mother, the first petitioner here and respondent nos.8 and 9, the minor’s grandmother and father’s brother, respectively. The Court also spoke to the minor, Mohan @ Bholey. It must be remarked that the minor, Mohan @ Bholey, though a bright child is still very young. He could not intelligibly express his wish or desire in the matter, though this Court did notice that he appeared to be attached to the grandmother, which for a child his age is logical, inasmuch as he has been staying with her for sometime. The mother came forward with an unqualified assertion of her right to hold the minor’s custody. She expressed all that a mother would in normal circumstances. She stays with her parents. On the other hand, the minor’s grandmother, Smt. Rani, an elderly woman and a widow, stays with her daughter, Smt. Laxmi, respondent no.7 and her son-in-law, Sandeep, respondent no.6. Apart from the question of the necessary wherewithal to bring up the minor, the grandmother’s advancing age, would be a decisive factor to consider, in the opinion of this Court. This Court also notices that respondent nos.6 and 7 have not come forward to undertake financial or other responsibility for the minor’s upbringing. So far as respondent no.9, Deen Dayal, the minor’s father’s brother is concerned, he candidly told the Court that he has no objection if the minor is given into the mother’s custody.

21. This Court must also note that the grandmother was very frantic about retaining the minor’s custody. She told the Court that her son, the minor’s father is dead and the minor means a lot to her. She is honest in expressing that sentiment of hers. But, her feelings alone cannot qualify her to be the person with whom the minor’s custody can best be entrusted. The mother, after all, is the natural guardian, under Section 6(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act and the sole surviving parent. There is, as earlier noticed, a presumption in favour of the parents taking best care of their children. In case of a mother, the presumption is very strong. Between the yearning grandmother and the mother, who claims custody of her child, certainly the mother is prima facie better entitled. At the same time, the grandmother and the father’s brother, respondent nos.8 and 9, who are closed kindred of the minor, are entitled to meet him.

22. It is made clear that whatever this Court has said is all tentative. Respondent nos.8 and 9 or any other person, who considers himself/ herself entitled to the minor’s custody, better than the mother, can move and establish that right before a Court of competent jurisdiction under the Act. If an application is brought under Section 25 of the Act or other appropriate proceeding under the said statute, anything said in this judgment, shall not affect the determination to be made by the Court of competent jurisdiction.

23. In the result, this Habeas Corpus Writ Petition succeeds and is allowed.

24. The rule nisi is made absolute. It is ordered that the minor be set at liberty by respondent nos.6 to 9 and delivered into custody of the mother, Smt. Reetu within a week of the date of this judgment. In case the custody of the minor is not delivered by respondent no.8 or respondent no.9, or any of the respondent nos.6 to 9, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etah shall cause it to be delivered to the first petitioner, Smt. Reetu by employment of necessary force through the Superintendent of Police, Etah. The Superintendent of Police, Etah is ordered to act in aid of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etah in the matter. It is further ordered that on the first Sunday of every month between 10:00 a.m. to 2.00 p.m., the first petitioner, Smt. Reetu shall permit respondent nos.8 and 9 to meet the minor, Mohan @ Bholey at her residence. During each such visit, the first petitioner shall extend all due courtesy to respondent nos.8 and 9 and will wholesomely facilitate the meeting.

25. Let this order be communicated forthwith by the Joint Registrar (Compliance) to the learned District Judge, Etah, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etah and the Superintendent of Police, Etah.

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