Judgment Analysis

NEHA GROVER ….. Appellant versus OM PRAKASH GROVER ….. Respondent + RFA 381/2019 & C.M. Nos.19599/2019 (for stay), 19601/2019 (for addl. doc.)

SNEHA AHUJA ….. Appellant versus SATISH CHANDER AHUJA ….. Respondent RFA 222/2019 & Conn. Page 1 of 66

+ RFA 598/2019 & C.M. No.29599/2019 (for stay) RUPALI KHULLAR ….. Appellant versus TARSEM LAL KHULLAR & ORS ….. Respondents + RFA 604/2019 & C.M. No.29735/2019 (for stay)

BINDYA GROVER ….. Appellant versus SUDARSHAN GROVER ….. Respondent + RFA 609/2019 & C.M. No.30047/2019 (for stay)

RENU KUMARI ….. Appellant versus GYANTI DEVI ….. Respondent

RFA 222/2019 & Conn.

The above noted batch of appeals under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, this Court is faced with the same question. The appellants herein are daughters-in-law who, with their husbands and children, have been residing in the premises which, as on date, are owned by the respondents, who are their mothers-in-law, fathers- in-law or both, as the case may be

The appellant/daughter-in-law is aggrieved by the decree of possession passed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC by the trial Court in favour of her in-laws, upon an admission made by her regarding their title over the suit premises

BRIEF FACTS in RFA 609/2019

The daughter-in-law assails the order dated 29.03.2019 passed by the Ld ADJ, Saket in CS No. 685/2018 where under the suit for ejectment and recovery of possession instituted against appellant by her mother-in-law, was decreed in favour of the latter by allowing her application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. Before the trial Court the mother-in-law claimed that her daughter- in-law, began residing with her son at the suit premises as gratuitous licensee after the solemnization of their marriage and that, when marital discord arose between the two parties, she disowned them vide a newspaper publication. Resultantly, her son had left the suit premises to reside in a separate rented accommodation while her daughter-in-law continued residing therein without any right, compelling her to institute the subject suit. In opposition, the daughter-in-law pleaded that as the suit premises was her shared household, she had a right to reside therein. The trial Court, however, by relying on the appellants admissions in the pleadings of the subject suit and the affidavit filed by her in the domestic violence proceedings that the suit premises was owned by her mother-in- law, passed the impugned order.

To sum up, in each of the decrees impugned by way of these appeals, the trial Courts have held that since the suit premises were, admittedly, owned by the in-laws and stood in their exclusive names, the in-laws were entitled to a decree for possession in their favour under Order XII Rule 6 CPC itself, without compelling them to await final adjudication of the suit after a prolonged trial.

RESPONDENT SUBMISSIONS

That a distinct feature of this appeal, setting it apart from the accompanying appeals, is that the daughter-in-law till date has not obtained an order protecting her right of residence in the suit premises from the DV Court. He relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs. Daya Sapra (Smt)(2009) 13 SCC 729 to contend that in any event, the decision of a DV Court, which is essentially a criminal court, is not binding in a civil proceeding as it has limited applicability in proceedings before a civil court for determining inter-alia who the accused was and the final outcome of such criminal proceeding; therefore, he submits that the orders passed by the DV Court were rightly not considered by the trial Court in the connected appeals, while passing the impugned decrees. Further, by relying upon Vimlaben Ajitbhai Patel (supra), he submits that the right to own and enjoy ones property is a constitutional right which cannot be overlooked when considering the right of residence of an aggrieved person under the DV Act and that the trial Court, after adhering to the prescribed procedure, had concluded that the suit premises was a self-acquired property of the in-laws, and protected their constitutional right thereon.

For the aforesaid reasons, the respondents submit that the present appeals, being meritless, ought to be dismissed

COURTS FINDING

From the rival submissions of the parties, the undisputed factual position which emerges is that in all these cases the suit premises are standing exclusively in the names of the in-laws, though the appellants in most of the appeals are claiming that either they or their husbands are also co-owners of the suit premises despite the title documents thereof not bearing their names. Moreover, in the light of the souring domestic relationship between the parties, except in RFA 604/2019, the appellants have already initiated proceedings before the DV Court; and in most cases there are subsisting interim orders passed by the DV Courts protecting the right of the daughters-in-law to reside in the suit premises. It is also undisputed that under the scheme of the Act, these residence orders are granted only when the DV Court returns prima facie finding that the suit premises is a shared household. The parties are also ad idem that under the DV Act if the aggrieved person, the daughters-in-law in these appeals, is found to be residing in a shared household, she is entitled to continue residing in the said household, irrespective of whether the premises are owned by her in-laws or by any other third party as long as the domestic relationship between them subsists. The bone of contention between the parties, however, is whether this right of the daughter-in-law is absolute and would continue during the continuance of the DV proceedings and till the subsistence of a domestic relationship between the in-laws and her, as the appellants would contend, or whether the same is transient in nature and subsists only till she is evicted by way of civil proceedings independently instituted by the owners seeking possession of the shared household as is sought to be contended by the respondents. The primary question which, thus, needs to be determined in these appeals is whether once domestic violence proceedings are pending and the daughter-in-law, or for that matter in favour of any aggrieved person, claims that she has a right of residence in the suit premises being her shared household, would the recorded owner of the property/shared household be entitled to institute a suit to recover possession from her during the pendency of the DV proceedings itself? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then the next question would be as to what procedure should be adopted and whether a decree of eviction can automatically be passed against the daughter-in-law on the basis of the title documents in favour of her in- laws, without considering the nature of her possession, the existing residence order in her favour or her claim that the suit premises is a shared household? An ancillary question is whether in a case where the daughter-in-law does not deny that the suit premises stands in the name of her in-laws but instead pleads that the same is a joint family property in which her estranged husband has a share, can a decree on admission under Order XII Rule 6 CPC be passed without giving her an opportunity to prove that the property is indeed joint family property?

Ever since its inception in 2005 the DV Act, which gives this right of residence to a person who may not have any ownership rights, has invited great controversy and has been the subject matter of numerous decisions of the Supreme Court and of this Court, exploring its application and the precise nature of its impact in varying domestic disputes. It would be instructive to refer to the observations of a Division Bench of this Court in Eveneet Singh (supra) wherein this Court, after examining the aims and objects for enactment of this social welfare legislation, has emphasised that the DV Act should be interpreted in a manner which furthers the objects of the Act

HELD

That in some of the appeals, i.e., in RFA Nos. 222/2019, 604/2019 and 609/2019, unlike the other appeals, there are no residence orders passed by the DV Court and, in fact, in RFA 222/2019, the DV Court has rendered a finding at the interim stage that the suit premises cannot be treated as a shared household. However, considering that the DV Act seeks to ensure that an aggrieved person, the appellant/daughter-in-law in these appeals, is not rendered without shelter during the pendency of the domestic violence proceedings and that these suits have been decreed by the trial Courts solely on the premise of ownership rights of the respondent over the suit premises, without appreciating the effect of the statutory rights under the DV Act claimed by the appellant; I am of the view that respondents rights as well as the nature of the appellants claim under the DV Act ought to be considered by the trial Courts prior to passing a decree evicting them from the suit premises.

In these circumstances, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained and are accordingly set aside. The matters are remanded back to the trial Court for fresh adjudication in accordance with the directions given hereinbelow:

• At the first instance, in all cases where the respondents son/the appellants husband has not been impleaded, the trial Court shall direct his impleadment by invoking its suo motu powers under Order I Rule 10 CPC.
• The trial Court will then consider whether the appellant had made any unambiguous admission about the respondents ownership rights in respect of the suit premises; if she has and her only defence to being dispossessed therefrom is her right of residence under the DV Act, then the trial Court shall, before passing a decree of possession on the sole premise of ownership rights, ensure that in view of the subsisting rights of the appellant under the DV Act, she is provided with an alternate accommodation as per Section 19(1)(f) of the DV Act, which will continue to be provided to her till the subsistence of her matrimonial relationship.
• In cases where the appellant specifically disputes the exclusive ownership rights of the respondents over the suit premises notwithstanding the title documents in their favour, the trial Court, while granting her an opportunity to lead evidence in support of her claim, will be entitled to pass interim orders on applications moved by the respondents, directing the appellant to vacate the suit premises subject to the provision of a suitable alternate accommodation to her under Section 19(1)(f) of the DV Act, which direction would also be subject to the final outcome of the suit.
• While determining as to whether the appellants husband or the in- laws bears the responsibility of providing such alternate accommodation to the appellant, if any, the trial Court may be guided by paragraph 46 of the decision in Vinay Verma (supra).
• The trial Court shall ensure that adequate safeguards are put in place to ensure that the direction for alternate accommodation is not rendered meaningless and that a shelter is duly secured for the appellant, during the subsistence of her matrimonial relationship.
• This exercise of directing the appellant to vacate the suit premises by granting her alternate accommodation will be completed expeditiously and not later than 6 months from today.

The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms

CONCLUSION

Wife should be provided with an alternate accommodation as per Section 19(1)(f) of the DV Act, which will continue to be provided to her till the subsistence of her matrimonial relationship.

providing the shelter or roof is upon the in-laws or upon the husband of the daughter-in-law i.e., the son. Some broad guidelines as set out below, can be followed by Courts in order to strike a balance between the PSC Act and the DV Act:

1. The court/tribunal has to first ascertain the nature of the relationship between the parties and the son‟s/ daughter‟s family.

2. If the case involves eviction of a daughter in law, the court has to also ascertain whether the daughter-in-law was living as part of a joint family.

3. If the relationship is acrimonious, then the parents ought to be permitted to seek eviction of the son/daughter-in-law or daughter/son- in-law from their premises. In such circumstances, the obligation of the husband to maintain the wife would continue in terms of the principles under the DV Act.

4. If the relationship between the parents and the son are peaceful or if the parents are seen colluding with their son, then, an obligation to maintain and to provide for the shelter for the daughter-in-law would remain both upon the in-laws and the husband especially if they were living as part of a joint family. In such a situation, while parents would be entitled to seek eviction of the daughter-in-law from their property, an alternative reasonable accommodation would have to be provided to her.

5. In case the son or his family is ill-treating the parents then the parents would be entitled to seek unconditional eviction from their property so that they can live a peaceful life and also put the property to use for their generating income and for their own expenses for daily living.

6. If the son has abandoned both the parents and his own wife/children, then if the son‟s family was living as part of a joint family prior to the breakdown of relationships, the parents would be entitled to seek possession from their daughter-in-law, however, for a reasonable period they would have to provide some shelter to the daughter-in-law during which time she is able to seek her remedies against her husband. 

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