Court: Uttaranchal High Court
Bench: JUSTICE U.C. Dhyani
Smt. Darshan Kaur vs Smt Sangeeta on 25 April 2017
Law Point:
Applicants, mother in law and sister in law of wife do not come within the definition of shared household and therefore, does not come in a domestic relationship. Proceedings quashed.
JUDGEMENT
1. By means of present Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the applicants seek to quash the impugned order dated 19.08.2010 as well as the entire proceedings of Misc. Case No. 85 of 2010, Smt. Sangeeta vs. Inder Pal Singh and others, under sections 12, 17, 19, 20, 22 & 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, pending in the Court of 2nd Additional Civil Judge/Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar.
2. Applicant no.1 is mother-in-law and applicant no. 2 is sister-
in-law of the respondent-victim. Proceedings have been initiated against the applicants under Sections 12, 17, 19, 20, 22 & 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and summons have been issued against them.
Aggrieved against the same, present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed.
3. It is the submission of learned counsel for the applicants that applicant no.1 is mother-in-law of the respondent and is suffering from parkinson’s disease since long. She is an old lady who could not even stand. Applicant no. 2 is married sister-in-law of the respondent, who is and has been living separately for the last seven years in her own family, from the house of the respondent-victim and her husband.
4. Learned counsel for the applicants argued that the petitioner no. 1 who is mother-in-law of respondent, is suffering from cardiac ailment, hypertension, Parkinson since long and in the month of January, 2009 she suffered fracture in her femur neck bone and since then she is suffering from severe ache in her thigh & is unable to stand or walk properly. Applicant no. 2 is the married sister-in-law, is living in Bhilai, Chhatishgarh for the last about 9 years, whereas son of the applicant no. 1 i.e., husband of the respondent resides in a rental accommodation and as such there are no sound reason of misbehaviour by present applicants.
5. The word ‘domestic relationship’ has been defined in Section 2 (f) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which is being quoted herein below:
“Section 2(f) in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005-
(f) “domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family;”
6. Likewise ‘shared household’ has been defined in Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which is being quoted herein below:
“Section 2(s) in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005-
(s) “shared household” means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household.”
7. The documents brought on record would reveal that the applicants who happen to be mother-in-law and married sister- in-law of the respondent did not come within the definition of ‘shared household’ and, therefore, do not come in the ‘domestic relationship’ in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.
8. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander and another, (2013) 1 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 986, has laid down certain principles in respect of exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Some of those principles, which are relevant in the context of present case, can be summarized as below:
i. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
ii. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.
iii. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.
iv. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
v. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loathe to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers.
vi. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.
vii. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender.
viii. The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.
ix. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. It may be purely a civil wrong or purely a criminal offence or a civil wrong as also a criminal offence constituting both on the same set of facts. But if the records disclose commission of a criminal offence and the ingredients of the offence are satisfied, then such criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely because a civil wrong has also been committed. The power cannot be invoked to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The factual foundation and ingredients of an offence being satisfied, the court will not either dismiss a complaint or quash such proceedings in exercise of its original jurisdiction.
x. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a ‘civil wrong’ with no ‘element of criminality’ and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the Court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.
xi. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction, the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.
xii. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.
xiii. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed with by the prosecution.
xiv. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.
xv. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.
xvi. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that interest of justice favours otherwise, it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.
xvii. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration.
9. A Constitutional Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the decision of Inder Mohan Gosami and another vs. State of Uttararanhal and others, reported in (2008) 1 SCC (Cri.) 259, has laid down the guidelines for exercising the powers under section 482 Cr.P.C., wherein it was held that inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised:
i. to give effect to an order under the Code; ii. to prevent abuse of the process of the court, and iii. to otherwise secure the ends of justice.
10. Although inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C.
has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid in the Section itself, but the instant case appears to be one such case in which this Court should intervene to quash the order impugned.
11. Accordingly Crl. Misc. Application No. 292 of 2017 filed by the applicants under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed. As a consequence thereof, the impugned order dated 19.08.2010 as well as the proceedings of Misc. Case No. 85 of 2010, Smt. Sangeeta vs. Inder Pal Singh and others, under Sections 12, 17, 19, 20, 22 & 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, pending in the Court of 2nd Additional Civil Judge/Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar, are set aside qua applicants.
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